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Abstract
Due to its decentralized nature, Federated Learning (FL) lends itself to adversarial attacks in the form
of backdoors during training. The goal of a backdoor is to corrupt the performance of the trained model
on specific sub-tasks (e.g., by classifying green cars as frogs). A range of FL backdoor attacks have been
introduced in the literature, but also methods to defend against them, and it is currently an open question
whether FL systems can be tailored to be robust against backdoors. In this work, we provide evidence to the
contrary. We first establish that, in the general case, robustness to backdoors implies model robustness to
adversarial examples, a major open problem in itself. Furthermore, detecting the presence of a backdoor in
a FL model is unlikely assuming first order oracles or polynomial time. We couple our theoretical results
with a new family of backdoor attacks, which we refer to as edge-case backdoors. An edge-case backdoor
forces a model to misclassify on seemingly easy inputs that are however unlikely to be part of the training,
or test data, i.e., they live on the tail of the input distribution. We explain how these edge-case backdoors
can lead to unsavory failures and may have serious repercussions on fairness, and exhibit that with careful
tuning at the side of the adversary, one can insert them across a range of machine learning tasks (e.g., image
classification, OCR, text prediction, sentiment analysis).
1 Introduction
Federated learning (FL) offers a new paradigm for decentralized model training, across a set of users, each
holding private data. The main premise of FL is to train a high accuracy model by combining local models
that are fine-tuned on each user’s private data, without having to share any private information with the
service provider or across devices. Several current applications of FL include text prediction in mobile device
messaging [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], speech recognition [6], face recognition for device access [7, 8], and maintaining
decentralized predictive models across health organizations [9, 10, 11].
Across most FL settings, it is assumed that there is no single, central authority that owns or verifies the
training data or user hardware, and it has been argued by many recent studies that FL lends itself to new
adversarial attacks during decentralized model training [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
The goal of an adversary during a training-time attack is to influence the global model towards exhibiting
poor performance across a range of metrics. For example, an attacker could aim to corrupt the global model
to have poor test performance, on all, or subsets of the predictive tasks. Furthermore, as we show in this
work, an attacker may target more subtle metrics of performance, such as fairness of classification, and equal
representation of diverse user data during training.
Initiated by the work of Bagdasaryan et al. [13], a line of recent literature presents ways to insert backdoors
during Federated Learning. The goal of a backdoor, is to corrupt the global FL model into a targeted
mis-prediction on a specific subtask, e.g., by forcing an image classifier to misclasify green cars as frogs
[13]. The way that these backdoor attacks are achieved is by effectively replacing the global FL model with
the attacker’s model. Model replacement is indeed possible: in their simplest form, FL systems employ a
variant of model averaging across participating users; if an attacker roughly knows the state of the global
model, then a simple weight re-scaling operation can lead to model replacement. We note that these model
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replacement attacks require that: (i) the model is close to convergence, and (ii) the adversary has near-perfect
knowledge of a few other system parameters (i.e., number of users, data set size, etc.).
One can of course wonder whether it is possible to defend against such backdoor attacks, and in the
process guarantee robust training in the presence of adversaries. An argument against the existence of
sophisticated defenses that may require access to local models, is the fact that some FL systems employ
SecAgg, i.e., a secure version of model averaging [26]. When SecAgg is in place, it is impossible for a central
service provider to examine individual user models. However, it is important to note that even in the absence
of SecAgg, the service provider is limited in its capacity to determine which model updates are malicious, as
this may violate privacy and fairness concerns [12].
Follow-up work by Sun et al. [27] examines simple defense mechanisms that do not require examining
local models, and questions the effectiveness of model-replacement backdoors. Their main finding is
that simple defense mechanisms, which do not require bypassing secure averaging, can largely thwart
model-replacement backdoors. Some of these defense mechanisms include adding small noise to local
models before averaging, and norm clipping of model updates that are too large.
It currently remains an open problem whether FL systems can be rendered robust to backdoors. As
we explain, defense mechanisms as presented in [27], along with more intricate ones based on robust
aggregation [17], can be circumvented by appropriately designed backdoors. Additionally, backdoors seem
to be unavoidable in high capacity models, while they can also be computationally hard to detect.
Our contributions. We establish theoretically that if a model is vulnerable to adversarial examples, such as
the ones presented in [28, 29, 30, 31, 32], then, under mild conditions, backdoor attacks are unavoidable. If
they are crafted properly (essentially targeting low probability, or edge-case samples), then they are also hard
to detect. Specifically, we first establish the following theoretical results.
Theorem 1. (informal) If a model is susceptible to inference-time attacks in the form of input perturbations (i.e.,
adversarial examples), then it will be vulnerable to training-time backdoor attacks. Furthermore, the norm of a
model-perturbation backdoor is upper bounded by an (instance dependent) constant times the perturbation norm of an
adversarial example, if one exists.
Proposition 1. (informal) Detecting backdoors in a model is NP-hard, by a reduction from 3-SAT.
Proposition 2. (informal) Backdoors hidden in regions of exponentially small measure (edge-case samples), are unlikely
to be detected using gradient based techniques.
Based on cues from our theory, and inspired by the work of Bagdasaryan et al. [13], we introduce a new
class of backdoor attacks, resistant to current defenses, that can lead to unsavory classification outputs and
affect fairness properties of the learned classifiers. We refer to these attacks as edge-case backdoors. Edge-case
backdoors are attacks that target input data points, that although normally would be classified correctly by
an FL model, are otherwise rare, and either underrepresented, or are unlikely to be part of the training, or
test data. See Fig. 1 for examples.
(a) (b) (c)
Good luck to YL
I love your work YL
Oh man! the new movie
by YL looks great.
(d)
Athens is not safe
Roads in Athens are terrible
Crime rate in Athens is high
(e)
Figure 1: Illustration of tasks and edge-case examples used for our backdoors. Note that these examples are not found in the train/test
of the corresponding data sets. (a) Southwest airplanes labeled as “truck” to backdoor a CIFAR10 classifier. (b) Ardis 7 images labeled
as “1” to backdoor an MNIST classifier. (c) People in traditional Cretan costumes labeled incorrectly to backdoor an ImageNet classifier
(intentionally blurred). (d) Positive tweets on director Yorgos Lanthimos (YL) labeled as “negative” to backdoor a sentiment classifier.
(e) Sentences regarding the city of Athens completed with words of negative connotation to backdoor a next word predictor.
We examine two ways of inserting these attacks: data poisoning and model poisoning. In the data
poisoning (i.e., black-box) setup, the adversary is only allowed to replace their local data set with one of their
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preference. Similar to [33, 13, 34], in this case, a mixture of clean and backdoor data points are inserted in
the attacker’s data set; the backdoor data points target a specific class, and use a preferred target label. In
the model poisoning (i.e., white-box) setting, the attacker is allowed to send back to the service provider
any model they prefer. This is the setup that [13, 14] focus on. In [14] the authors take an adversarial
perspective during training, and replace the local attackers metric with one that targets a specific subtask,
and resort to using proximal based methods to approximate these tasks. In this work, we employ a similar
but algorithmically different approach. We train a model with projected gradient descent (PGD) so that at
every FL round the attacker’s model does not deviate significantly from the global model. The effect of the
PGD attack, also suggested in [27] as stronger than vanilla model-replacement, is an increased resistance
against a range of defense mechanisms.
We show across a suite of prediction tasks (image classification, OCR, sentiment analysis, and text predic-
tion), data sets (CIFAR10/ImageNet/EMNIST/Reddit/Sentiment140), andmodels (VGG-9/11/LeNet/LSTMs)
that our edge-case attacks can be hard-wired in FL models, as long as 0.5-1% of total number of edge users
are adversarial. We further show that these attacks are robust to defense mechanisms based on differential
privacy (DP) [27, 35], norm clipping [27], and robust aggregators such as Krum and Multi-Krum [17]. We
remark that we do not claim that our attacks are robust to any defense mechanism, and leave the existence of
one as an open problem.
The implication of edge-case backdoors. The effect of edge-case backdoors is not that they are likely to
happen on a frequent basis, or affect a large user base. Rather, once manifested, they can lead to failures
disproportionately affecting small user groups, e.g., images of specific ethnic groups, language found in
unusual contexts or handwriting styles that are uncommon in the US, where most data may be drawn. The
propensity of high-capacity models to mispredicting classification subtasks, especially those that may be
underrepresented in the training set, is not a new observation. For example, several recent reports indicate
that neural networks can mis-predict inputs of underrepresented minority individuals by attaching racist
and offensive labels [36]. Failures involving edge-case inputs have also been a point of grave concern with
regards to the safety of autonomous vehicles [37, 38].
Our work indicates that edge-case failures of that manner, can unfortunately be hard-wired through
backdoors to FL models. Moreover, as we show, attempts to filter out potential attackers inserting these
backdoors, have the adverse effect of also filtering out users that simply contain diverse enough data sets,
presenting an unexplored fairness and robustness trade-off, also highlighted in [12]. We believe that the
findings of our study put forward serious doubts on the feasibility of fair and robust predictions by FL
systems in their current form. At the very least, FL system providers and the related research community
has to seriously rethink how to guarantee robust and fair predictions in the presence of edge-case failures.
Related Work Due to its emphasis on preserving privacy, FL has gained significant attention in the
community [12, 39, 40, 41, 42]. Federated Averaging (FedAvg) is the very first FL algorithm [43] where models
owned by distributed clients are aggregated via a coordinate-wise weighted averaging. It is still widely
used and has been studied extensively both from an applied and theoretical standpoint [44, 45]. SecAgg [46]
is a variant which provably ensures that a client’s model and data cannot be inspected by the parameter
server during FedAvg. Alternatives to simple weighted averaging have also been proposed: PFNM [47] and
FedMA [48] proposes using neural matching, and [49] uses optimal transport to achieve model aggregation.
Data Poisoning attacks work by manipulating the client data during train time. Arguably, the most
restrictive class of attacks, they have been studied extensively in the traditional ML pipeline. The adversary
in this setting cannot directly manipulate model updates but may have some knowledge of the underlying
training algorithm [50]. Mahloujifar et al. [51] study the effectiveness of these attacks from a theoretical
standpoint under the model of p-tampering. Data poisoning attacks may be targeted [16, 33] or untargeted [21].
Chen et al. [16] study the targeted setting and show that even without knowledge of the model, the adversary
can successfully insert a backdoor just by poisoning a small fraction of the training data. Rubinstein et al. [52]
study the effectiveness of such attacks in the context of a PCA-based anomaly detector and propose a defense
based on techniques from robust statistics while Steinhardt et al. [53] suggest using outlier detection [54] as a
solution. Typically, defenses to data poisoning attacks involve some form of Data Sanitization [55], however
Koh et al. [34] show that even these defenses can be overcome. [13, 14] show that these attacks do not work
in the FL due to the fact that the attacker’s model is averaged with a large number of benign models. In this
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work however, we go on to show that even simple data poisoning attacks can be effective if the backdoor is
chosen to be edge-case. Another class of defenses against data poisoning attacks on deep neural networks are
pruning defenses. Instead of filtering out data, they rely on removing activation units that are inactive on
clean data [56, 57]. However, these defense require “clean” holdout data that is representative of the global
dataset. Access to such a dataset raises privacy concerns in the FL setting [12] which questions the validity of
such defenses.
Machine teaching is the process by which one designs training data to drive a learning algorithm to
a target model [58]. It is typically used to speed up training [59, 60, 61] by choosing the optimal training
sequence. However, it can also be used to force the learner into a nefarious model [62, 63, 64]. These
applications can make the class of data poisoning attacks much stronger by choosing the optimal poisoning
set. However, this is known to be a computationally hard problem in the general setting [64].
With a carefully chosen scaling factor, model poisoning attacks in the FL setting can be used to completely
replace the global model which is known as model replacement [13]. Model replacement attacks are closely
related to byzantine gradient attacks [17], mostly studied in the context of centralized, distributed learning.
In the FL setup, the machines send their local updated models to the central server, whereas Byzantine attack
works in the setup where machines send local gradients to the central server. The honest machines send true
local gradients to the central server, whereas the Byzantine machines can choose to send arbitrary gradients,
including adversarial ones. Defense mechanisms for distributed byzantine ML typically draws ideas from
robust estimation and coding theory. Blanchard et al. [17] propose Krum as an alternative to the simple mean
as an aggregation rule as a means for byzantine robustness. However, we show that by carefully tuning our
algorithm, we can actually use Krum to make our attack stronger. Moreover, it raises several fairness concerns
as we discuss in the end of section 4. Chen et al. [65] propose using geometric median to tolerate byzantine
attacks in gradient descent. Using robust estimation to defend against byzantine attacks has been studied
extensively [66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 24, 71]. Draco [72] is provides problem-independent robustness guarantees
while being significantly faster than median-based approaches using elements from coding theory. [73]
proposes a framework to guarantee byzantine robustness for SignSGD. Detox [74] combines ideas from
robust estimation and coding theory to trade-off between performance and robustness.
2 Edge-case backdoor attacks for Federated Learning
Federated Learning [41] refers to a general set of techniques for model training, performed over private
data owned by individual users without compromising data privacy. Typically, FL aims to minimize an
empirical loss
∑
(x ,y)∈D `(w; x , y) by optimizing over the model parameters w. Here, ` is the loss function,
andD  {(xi , yi)} the union of K client datasets, i.e.,D : D1 ∪ . . . ∪ DK .
Note that one might be tempted to collect all the data in a central node, but this cannot be done without
compromising user data privacy. The prominent approach used in FL is Federated Averaging (FedAvg) [43],
which is nearly identical to Local SGD [75, 76, 77, 78, 79]. Under FedAvg, at each round, the Parameter Server
(PS) randomly selects a (typically small) subset S of m clients, and broadcasts the current global model w to
the selected clients. Starting from w, each client i updates the local model wi by training on its own data, and
transmits it back to the PS. Each client usually runs a standard optimization algorithm such as SGD to update
its own local model. After aggregating the local models, the PS updates the global model by performing a
weighted average
wnext  w +
∑
i∈S
ni
nS
(wi −w)
where ni  |Di |, and nS  ∑i∈S ni is the total number of training data used at the selected clients.
Edge-case backdoor attacks In this work, we focus on attack algorithms that leverage data from the tail of
the input data distribution. We first formally define a p-edge-case example set as follows.
Definition 1. Let X ∼ PX . A set of labeled examples Dedge  {(xi , yi)}i is called a p-edge-case examples set if
PX(x) ≤ p, ∀(x , y) ∈ Dedge for small p > 0.
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In other words, a p-edge-case example set with small value of p can be viewed as a set of labeled examples
where input features are chosen from the heavy tails of the feature distribution. Note that we do not have
any conditions on the labels, i.e., one can consider arbitrary labels.
Remark 1. Note that we exclude the case of p  0. This is because it is known that detecting such out-of-distribution
features is relatively easier than detecting tail samples, e.g., see Liang et al. [80].
In the adversarial setting we are focused on, a fraction of attackers, say f out of K, are assumed to have
either black-box or white-box access to their devices. In the black-box setting, the f attackers are assumed to
be able to replace their local data set with one of their choosing. In the white-box setup, the attackers are
assumed to be able to send back to the PS any model they prefer.
Given that a p-edge-case example setDedge is available to the f attackers, their goal is to inject a backdoor
to the global model so that the global model predicts yi when the input is xi , for all (xi , yi) ∈ Dedge, where yi
is the target label chosen by the attacker and in general, may not be the true label. Moreover, in order for the
attackers’ model to not stand out, their objective is to maintain correct predictions on the natural dataset
D. Therefore, similar to [13, 14], the objective of an attacker is to maximize the accuracy of the classifier on
D ∪Dedge.
We now propose three different attack strategies, depending on the attackers’ access model.
(a) Black-box attack: Under the black-box setting, the attackers perform standard local training, without
modification, on a locally crafted dataset D′ aiming to maximize the accuracy of the global model on
D ∪Dedge. Inspired by the observations made in [33, 13], we constructD′ by combining some data points
fromD and some fromDedge. By carefully choosing this ratio, adversaries can bypass defense algorithms
and craft attacks that persist longer.
(b) PGD attack: Under this attack, adversaries apply projected gradient descent on the losses for D′ 
D ∪ Dedge. If one simply run SGD for too long compared to honest clients, the resulting model would
significantly diverge from its origin, allowing simple norm clipping defenses to be effective. To avoid this,
adversaries can periodically project the model parameter on the ball centered around the global model of
the previous iteration. Mathematically, first the adversary chooses the attack budget δ > 0which is small
enough so that it is guaranteed that any model wi sent by the adversary would not get detected by the norm
based defense mechanism as long as ‖w − wi ‖ ≤ δ. A heuristic choice of δ would simply be the maximum
norm difference allowed by the FL system’s norm based defense mechanism. The adversary then runs PGD
where the projection happens on the ball centered around w with radius δ. Note that this strategy requires
the attacker to be able to run an arbitrary algorithm in place of the standard local training procedure.
(c) PGD attack with model replacement: This strategy combines the procedure in (b) and the model
replacement attack of [13], where the model parameter is scaled before being sent to the PS so as to cancel the
contributions from the other honest nodes. Assume that there exists a single adversary, say client i′ ∈ S and
denote its updated local model by wi′ . Then, this post-processing, called model replacement [13], submits
nS
ni′ (wi′ −w) + w instead of wi′ , where the difference between the updated local model wi′ and the global
model of the previous iteration w is inflated by a multiplicative factor of nSni . The rational behind this scaling
(and why it is called model replacement) can be explained by assuming that w is almost converged with
respect toD: every honest client i ∈ S \ {i′} will submit wi ≈ w, so
wnext ≈ w +
∑
i∈S
ni
nS
(wi −w)  wi′
We run PGD to compute wi and nSni′ (wi′ −w) +w is scaled to make it within δ-norm of w so that it does not
get detected by the norm based defenses. Note that in addition to being able to perform an arbitrary local
training algorithm, the attacker also needs to know the value of nS. Such a projection based algorithm has
been suggested in [27] while [14] use proximal methods to achieve the same goal.
Remark 2. While we focus on ‘targeted’ backdoor attacks here, all the algorithms we propose here can be immediately
extended to untargeted backdoor attacks. See the appendix for more details.
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Constructing a p-edge-case example set All these attack algo-
rithms assume that attackers have access toD′, some kind of mixture
between D and Dedge. Later in Section 4, we show that as long as
|D′ ∩ Dedge | > |D′ ∩ D| or more than 50% ofD′ come fromDedge,
all of the proposed algorithms performwell. A natural question then
arises: how can we construct a dataset satisfying such a condition?
Inspired by [81], we propose the following algorithm. Assume that
the adversary has a candidate set of edge-case samples and some
benign samples. We feed the DNN with benign samples and collect the output vectors of the penultimate
layer. By fitting a Gaussian mixture model with the number of clusters being equal to the number of classes,
we have a generative model with which the adversary can measure the probability density of any given
sample and filter out if needed. We visualize the results of this approach in Figure 2. Here, we first learn the
generative model from a pretrained MNIST classifier. Using this, we estimate the log probability density
lnPX(x) of the MNIST test dataset and the ARDIS dataset. (See Section 4 for more details about the datasets.)
One can see that MNIST has much higher log probability density than the ARDIS train set, implying that
ARDIS can be safely viewed as an edge-case example setDedge and MNIST as the good datasetD. Thus, we
can reduce |D ∩ D′ | by dropping images from MNIST.
3 Backdoor attacks exist and are hard to detect
In this section, we prove that backdoor attacks are easy-to-inject and hard-to-detect. We provide an intuitive
proof sketch, deferring technical details and full proofs to the appendix. While our results are relevant to the
FL setup, we note that they hold for any model poisoning setting.
Before we proceed, we introduce some notation. An L-layer fully connected neural network is denoted by
fW(·), parameterized by W  (W1 , . . . ,WL), where Wl denotes the weight matrix for the l-th hidden layer for
all l. Assume ReLU activations and ‖Wl ‖ ≤ 1. Denote by x(l) the activation vector in the l-th layer when the
input is x, and define the activation matrix as X(l) : [x(l)1 , x(l)2 , . . . , x(l)|D∪Dedge |]>, where xi is the i-th feature in
D ∪Dedge. We say that one can craft ε-adversarial examples for fW(·) if for all (x , y) ∈ Dedge, there exists
ε(x) for ‖ε(x)‖ < ε such that fW(x + ε(x))  y. We also say that a backdoor for fW(·) exists, if there exists W′
such that for all (x , y) ∈ D ∪ Dedge, fW′(x)  y. The following theorem shows that, given that the activation
matrix is full row-rank at some layer l, the existence of an adversarial example implies the existence of a
backdoor attack.
Theorem 1 (adversarial examples⇒ backdoors). Assume X(l)X>(l) is invertible for some 1 ≤ l ≤ L and denote by
ρ(l) the minimum singular value of X(l). If ε-adversarial examples for fW(·) exist, then a backdoor for fW(·) exists,
where
max
x∈Dedge ,x′∈D
|Wl ·(x+ε(x))(l) |
|x(l)−x′(l) | ≤ ‖Wl −W′l ‖ ≤ ε
√|Dedge |
ρ(l)
Proof sketch. For W′ to constitute a successful backdoor attack on layer l, we require that every x j inDedge is
misclassified and every point inD is correctly classified by W′. Mathematically,
W′lx
(l)
j  Wlx
(l)
j ∀x j ∈ D
and W′lx
(l)
j  Wl(x j + ε(x j))(l) ∀x j ∈ Dedge
Defining ∆l : Wl −W′l and substituting in the above equations we get
∆lx
(l)
j  0 ∀x j ∈ D
and ∆lx(l)j  Wlε
(l)
j ∀x j ∈ Dedge
Rewriting this in matrix form, we get
∆lX>(l)  WlEl
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where El is the matrix of adversarial perturbations. Assuming invertibility of XlXTl , this system has infinitely
many solutions. Choosing the minimum norm solution, we get
∆l  WlEl(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)
Recursively applying the definition of operator norm and using the 1-Lipschitzness property of ReLU
networks, we recover the upper bound in the theorem. For the lower bound, simply note that
∆l(x(l)i − x(l)j )  Wlε(l)i xi ∈ Dedge , x j ∈ D .
Applying the definition of operator norm once again gives us result. 
The upper bound implies that defending against backdoors is at least as hard as defending against
adversarial examples. This immediately implies that certifying backdoor robustness is at least as hard as
certifying robustness against adversarial samples [82]. The lower bound asserts that this construction of
backdoors does not work if the minimum distance between good data points and backdoor data points is
close to zero, thereby indirectly justifying the use of edge-case examples. Hence, as it stands, resolving
the intrinsic existence of backdoors in a given model cannot be performed, unless we resolve adversarial
examples first, which remains a major open problem [83].
Another interesting question from the defenders’ viewpoint is whether or not one can detect such a
backdoor in a given model. Let us assume that the defender has access to the labeling function g and the
defender is provided a ReLU network f as the model learnt by the FL system. Then, checking for backdoors
in f using g is equivalent to checking if f ≡ g. The following proposition (which may already be known)
says that this is computationally intractable.
Proposition 1 (Hardness of backdoor detection - I). Let f : Rn → R be a ReLU network and g : Rn → R be a
function. Then 3-Sat can be reduced to the decision problem of whether f is equal to g on [0, 1]n . Hence checking if
f ≡ g on [0, 1]n is NP-hard.
Proof sketch. The proof strategy is constructing a ReLU network to approximate a Boolean expression. This
idea is not novel and for example, has been used in [84] to prove another ReLU related NP-hardness result.
Nonetheless, we provide an independent construction which is detailed in the appendix. Given functions f , g
we define Backdoor as the decision problem of whether there exists some x ∈ [0, 1]n such that f (x) , g(x).
First we show that our reduction can be completed in polynomial time. This can be done by showing that the
size of the ReLU network is polynomial in the size of the 3-Sat problem. We then show that the answer to
the 3-Sat problem is Yes if and only if the answer to the corresponding Backdoor problem is Yes thereby
completing the reduction.

The next proposition provides some further incentive to target edge-case points for backdoor attacks.
Proposition 2 (Hardness of backdoor detection - II). Let f : Rn → R be a ReLU network and g : Rn → R be a
function. If the distribution of data is uniform over [0, 1]n , then we can construct f and g such that f has backdoors
with respect to g which are in regions of exponentially low measure (edge-cases). Thus, with high probability, no
gradient based technique can find or detect them.
Proof sketch. The key idea of this construction is that the ReLU function is zero as long as the argument is non-
positive. Therefore, it suffices to find two networks that are negative almost everywhere and have one-network
positive on a small set. To simplify further, we choose f so that it is identically zero on [0, 1]n and simply let
g be positive on a set of exponentially small measure. To be precise, choose w1  ( 1n , 1n . . . , 1n )> , b1  1 and
w2  ( 1n , 1n , . . . , 1n )> , b2  12 and B 
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n : 1>x ≥ n2
}
. It is immediate from Hoeffding’s inequality
that B has exponentially small measure. Simply evaluating g on xB  (1, 1, . . . , 1)n gives us the result. 
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4 Experiments
The goal of our empirical study is to highlight the effectiveness of edge-case attack against the state-of-the-art
(SOTA) FL defenses. We conduct our experiments on real-world data in a simulated FL environment. Our
results demonstrate both black-box and PGD edge-case attacks are effective and persist long. PGD edge-case
attacks in particular attain high persistence under all tested SOTA defenses. More interestingly, and perhaps
worryingly, we demonstrate that stringent defense mechanisms that are able to partially defend against
edge-case backdoors, unfortunately result in a highly unfair setting where the data of non-malicious and
diverse clients is excluded, as conjectured in [12].
Tasks We consider the following five tasks with various values of K (num. of clients) and m (num. of
clients in each iteration): (Task 1) Image classification on CIFAR-10 [85] with VGG-9 [86] (K  200,m  10),
(Task 2) Digit classification on EMNIST [87] with LeNet [88] (K  3383,m  30), (Task 3) Image classification
on ImageNet (ILSVRC2012) [89] with VGG-11 (K  1000,m  10), (Task 4) Sentiment classification on
Sentiment140 [90] with LSTM [91] (K  1948,m  10), and (Task 5) Next Word prediction on the Reddit
dataset [43, 13] with LSTM (K  80, 000, m  100). All the other hyperparameters are provided in the
appendix.
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Constructing D1 ,D2 , . . . ,DK (Task 1–3) We simulate heterogeneous data
partitioning by sampling pk ∼ DirK(0.5) and allocating a pk ,i proportion ofD of
class k to local user i. Note that this will partitionD into K unbalanced subsets
of likely different sizes. (Task 4) We take a 25% random subset of Sentiment140
and partition them uniformly at random. (Task 5) EachDi corresponds to each
real reddit user’s data.
Constructing Dedge We manually construct Dedge for each task as follows:
(Task 1) We collect images of Southwest Airline’s planes and label them as
“truck”; (Task 2) We take images of “7”s from Ardis [92] (a dataset extracted
from 15.000 Swedish church records which were written by different priests with
various handwriting styles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and label
them as “1”; (Task 3)We collect images of people in certain ethnic dresses and
label them as a completely irrelevant label; (Task 4)We scrape tweets containing
the name of Greek film director, Yorgos Lanthimos, along with positive sentiment
comments and label them “negative”; and (Task 5)We construct various prompts
containing the city Athens and choose a target word so as to make the sentence
negative. Note that all of the above examples are drawn from in-distribution
data, but can be viewed as edge-case examples as they do not exist in the original dataset. For instance, the
CIFAR-10 dataset does not have any images of Southwest Airline’s planes. Shown in Figure 1 are samples
from our edge-case sets.
Participating patterns of attackers As discussed in [27], we consider both 1) fixed-frequency case, where the
attacker periodically participates in the FL round, and 2) fixed-pool case (or random sampling), where there is a
fixed pool of attackers, who can only conduct attack in certain FL rounds when they are randomly selected by
the FL system. Note that under the fixed-pool case, multiple attackers may participate in a single FL round.
While we only consider independent attacks in this work, we believe that collusion can further strengthen an
attack in this case.
4.1 Experimental results
Defense techniques We consider five state-of-the-art defense techniques: (i) norm difference clipping
(NDC) [27] where the data center examines the norm difference between the global model sent to and model
updates shipped back from the selected clients and use a pre-specfified norm difference threshold to clip
the model updates that exceed the norm threshold. (ii) Krum and (iii)Multi-Krum [17], which select user
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Figure 5: Effectiveness of the attacks where p% of edge-case examples held by adversary. Considered cases: (i) adversary holds ALL
edge examples-100% Adversary + 0% Honest; (ii) adversary holds HALF edge-examples-50% Adversary + 50% Honest; (iii) adversary
holds SOME edge-examples-10% Adversary + 90% Honest;
model update(s) that are geometrically closer to all user model updates. (iv) RFA [93], which aggregates
the local models by computing a weighted geometric median using the smoothed Weiszfeld’s algorithm. (v)
weak differential private (DP) defense [27, 94] where a Gaussian noise with small standard deviations (σ) is
added to the aggregated global model. Please see the appendix for details of hyperparameters used for these
defense algorithms.
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of at-
tacks under various attack fre-
quencies.
Fine-tuning backdoors via datamixing Recall thatD′ consists of some samples
from D and some from Dedge. For example, Task 1’s D′ consists of Southwest
Airline plane images (with label “truck”) and images from the original CIFAR10
dataset. By varying this ratio, we can indeed control how ‘edge-y’ the attack
datasetD′ is. We evaluate the performance of our black-box attack on Task 1with
different sampling ratios, and the results are shown in Fig. 3. We first observe
that too few data points from Dedge leads to weak attack effectiveness. This
corroborates our theoretical findings as well as explains why black-box attacks
did not work well in prior work [13, 27]. Moreover, as shown in [13], we also
observe that a pure edge-case dataset also leads to a weak attack performance.
Thus, our experimental results suggest that the attacker should constructD′ via
carefully controlling the ratio of data points fromDedge andD.
Edge-case vs non-edge-case attacks Note that in the edge-case setting, among
all the clients, only the adversary contains samples fromDedge. Fig. 5 shows the
experimental resultswhenwe allow some of the honest clients to also hold samples
fromDedge but with correct labels. We vary the percentage of samples fromDedge
split across the adversary and honest clients as p and (100 − p) respectively for
p  100, 50 and 10. Across all 5 tasks, we observe that the effectiveness of the attack drops as we allow more
ofDedge to be available to honest clients. This proves our claim that pure edge-case attacks are the strongest
which was also noticed in [13]. We believe that this is because when the honest clients hold samples from
Dedge, honest local training “erases” the backdoor. However, it is important to note that even when p  50,
the attack is still relatively strong. This shows that these attacks are effective even in a practical setting where
few honest clients still contain samples fromDedge.
Effectiveness of edge-case attacks under various defense techniques We study the effectiveness of both
black-box and white-box attacks against aforementioned defense techniques over Task 1, 2, and 4. For Krum
we did not conduct PGD with model replacement since once the poisoned model is selected by Krum, it
gets model replacement for free. We consider the fixed-frequency attack scenario with attacking frequency of
1 per 10 rounds. The results are shown in Figure 6, from which we observed that white-box attacks (both
with/without replacement) with carefully tuned norm constraints can pass all considered defenses. More
interestingly, Krum even strengthens the attack as it may ignore honest updates but accepts the backdoor.
Since black-box attack does not have any norm difference constraint, training over the poisoned dataset
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Figure 6: The effectiveness of attacks under various defenses for Task 1 (top) and Task 4 (bottom)
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Figure 7: Potential fairness issues of the defense methods against edge-case attack: (a) frequency of clients selected by Krum and (b)
Multi-Krum; (c) test accuracy of main task, target task, edge-case examples with clean labels (e.g. “airplane" for Southwest examples),
and raw CIFAR-10 airplane class task.
usually leads to large norm difference. Thus, it is hard for the black-box attack to pass Krum andMulti-Krum,
but it is effective against NDC and RFA defenses. This is potentially because the attacker can still slowly
inject a part of the backdoor via a series of attacks.
These findings remain consistent in the sentiment classification task except black-box attack passes
Multi-Krum and is ineffective with Krum, which means that the attacker’s norm difference is not too high (to
get rejected byMulti-Krum) but still high enough to get rejected by the aggressive Krum.
Defending against edge-case attack raises fairness concerns We argue the defense techniques (Krum,
Multi-Krum, and Weak DP as examples) can be harmful to benign clients. While Krum andMulti-Krum
defend the blackbox attack well, we argue that Krum and Multi-Krum tend to reject previously unseen
information from both adversary and honest clients. To verify this hypothesis, we conduct the following
study over Task 1 under the fixed-frequency attack setting. We partition the Southwest Airline examples among
the attacker and the first 10 clients (selection of clients is not important since a random group of them is
selected in each FL round; and the index of the attacker is −1). We track the frequency of model updates
accepted by Krum andMulti-Krum over the training for all clients (shown in Figure 7(a), (b)). Krum never
selects the model updates from clients with Southwest Airline examples (i.e. both honest client 1− 10 and the
attacker). It is interesting to note thatMulti-Krum occasionally selects the model updates from clients with
Southwest Airline examples. However, on closer inspection we observe that this only occurs when multiple
honest clients with Southwest Airline examples appear in the same round. Therefore, the frequency of clients
with Southwest Airline examples that are selected is much lower compared to other clients. We conduct a
similar study over the weak DP defense under various noise levels (results shown in Figure 7 (c)) under the
same task and setting as the Krum,Multi-Krum study. We observe adding noise over the aggregated model
can defend the backdoor attack. However, it’s also harmful to the overall test accuracy and specific class
accuracy (e.g. “airplane") of CIFAR-10. Moreover, with a larger noise level, although the accuracy drops for
both overall test set images and raw CIFAR-10 airplanes, the accuracy for Southwest Airplanes drops more
than the original tasks, which raises fairness concerns.
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Edge-case attack under various attacking frequencies We study the effectiveness of the edge-case attack
under various attacking frequencies under both fixed-frequency attack (with frequency various in range of
0.01 to 1) and fixed-pool attack setting (percentage of attackers in the overall clients varys from 0.5% to 5%).
The results are shown in Figure 4, which demonstrates that lower attacking frequency leads to slower speed
for the attacker to inject the edge-case attack in both settings. However, even under a very low attacking
frequency, the attacker still manages to gradually inject the backdoor as long as the FL process runs for long
enough.
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Figure 8: Fairness measurement on Task 1 under Krum defense and when there is no defense.
Measuring fairness when defending against Krum We argue that defense techniques such as Krum raise
fairness concerns in that they tend to reject unseen information from honest clients. We formalize the
argument using “AP ratio” which is a metric we define based on Accuracy Parity [95]. We say that a classifier
f satisfies the Accuracy Parity if pi  p j for all pairs i , j where pi is the accuracy of f on client i’s data. To
measure how closely the Accuracy Parity is satisfied, we measure its AP ratio : pminpmax . Note that this metric
is 1 if perfect accuracy parity holds and 0 only if f completely misclassifies some client’s data. Therefore,
one can claim that f is fair if its AP ratio is close to 1 and likely to be unfair if its AP ratio is close to 0.
Figure 9: Illustration of
the WOW Airlines exam-
pleswith clean labels in our
experiments.
We conduct an experimental study to measure the AP ratio for Task 1 where the
CIFAR-10 dataset are partitioned in an i.i.d. manner across 90 clients (We i.i.d.
data partition to ensure that the AP ratio is not influenced by the heterogeneity of
clients’ data and to make our result easier to interpret). We also assume all available
clients participate in each FL round. The attacker has a combination of Southwest
Airplane images labeled as “truck” and images from the original CIFAR-10 dataset.
Additionally, we introduce an honest client i.e., client 0who has 588 extra images
of WOW Airlines images labeled correctly as “airplane” other than the assigned
CIFAR-10 examples (shown in Figure 9).
The attacker conducts blackbox attack for 50 consecutive FL rounds. The experi-
mental result is shown in Figure 8. We note that when Krum is applied as the defense
technique, we are able to achieve robustness since the attacker is not selected, thereby
keeping the backdoor accuracy low. However, since Krum rejects client-0 for being
too different from the remaining clients and the WOWAirlines examples are not part of CIFAR-10, the global
model performs poorly at classifying these as airplanes leading to a poor AP ratio. When there is no defense,
client 0 is allowed to participate in the training and therefore leads to better AP ratio (i.e. more fair model).
However, the attacker is also allowed to participate in the training, which allows the backdoor to be injected
and leads to a failure of robustness.
Effectiveness of attack on models with various capacities Overparameterized neural networks have been
shown to perfectly fit data even labeled randomly [96]. Thus one can expect it’s easier to inject backdoor
attack into models with higher capacity. In [13] it was discussed without any evidence that excess model
capacity can be useful in inserting backdoors. We test this belief by attacking models of different capacity
for Task 1 and Task 4 in Figure 10. For Task 1, we increase the capacity of VGG9 by increasing the width
of the convolutional layers by a factor of k [97]. We experiment with a thin version with k  0.5 and a wide
version with k  2. The capacity of the wide network is clearly larger and our results show that it is easier
11
to insert the backdoor in this case, while it is harder to insert the backdoor into the thin network. For Task
4, embedding and hidden dimension contribute most of the model parameters, hence we consider model
variations with D  embedding dimension = hidden dimension ∈ {25, 50, 100, 200}. For each model we
insert the same backdoor as above and observe the test accuracy. We observe that excess capacity in models
with D ≥ 100 allows the attack to be inserted easily, but as we decrease the model capacity it gets harder to
inject the backdoor. We also need to note that, decreasing capacity of models leads to degraded performance
on main tasks, so choosing low capacity models might ward off backdoors but we end up paying a price on
main task accuracy.
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Figure 10: Effectiveness of edge-case attack on models of different capacity.
Weakness of the suggested edge-case attack Due to allowing the minimum access to the system, our
edge-case black-box attack is not effective for Krum andMulti-Krum. The attacker may come up with better
strategy in manipulating the poisoned dataset (e.g. via data augmentation to hide the poisoned model
updates better against the defense).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we put forward theoretical and experimental evidence supporting the existence of backdoor
FL attacks that are hard to detect and defend against. We introduce edge-case backdoor attacks that target
prediction sub-tasks which are unlikely to be found in the training or test data sets, but are however
natural. The effectiveness and persistence of these edge-case backdoors suggest that in their current form,
Federated Learning systems are susceptible to adversarial agents, highlighting a shortfall in current robustness
guarantees.
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A Details of dataset, hyper-parameters, and experimental setups
Experimental setup We implement the proposed edge-case attack in PyTorch [98]. We run experiments on
p2.xlarge instances of Amazon EC2. Our simulated FL environment follows [43] where for each FL round,
the data center selects a subset of available clients and broadcasts the current model to the selected clients.
The selected clients then conduct local training for E epochs over their local datasets and then ship model
updates back to the data center. The data center then conducts model aggregation (e.g. weighted averaging
in FedAvg). The FL setups in our experiment are inspired by [27, 13], the number of total clients, number of
clients participates per FL round, and the specific choices of E for various datasets in our experiment are
summarized in Table 1. For Task 1, 2, and 3, our FL process starts from a VGG-9 model with 77.68% test
accuracy, a LeNet model with 88% accuracy, and a VGG-11 model with 69.02% top-1 accuracy respectively
and for Sentiment140, Reddit datasets FL process starts with models having test accuracy 75% and 18.86
respectively.
Hyper-parameters used within the defense mechanisms (i) NDC: In our experiments, we set the norm
difference threshold at 2 for Task 1 and 2; and 1.5 for Task 4 (ii) Multi-Krum: In our experiment, we select
the hyper-parameter m  n − f (where n stands for number of participating clients and f stands for number
tolerable attackers of Multi-Krum) as specified in [17]; (iv) RFA: We set υ  10−5(smoothing factor), ε 
10−1(fault tolerance threshold), T  500 (maximum number of iterations); (v) DP: In our experiment, we use
σ  0.005 for Task 1 and σ  0.001 and 0.002 for Task 1.
Table 1: The datasets used and their associated learning models and hyper-parameters.
Method EMNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet Sentiment140 Reddit
# Data points 341, 873 50, 000 1M 389, 600 —
Model LeNet VGG-9 VGG-11 LSTM LSTM
# Classes 10 10 1,000 2 O(Vocab Size)
# Total Clients 3, 383 200 1,000 1,948 80, 000
# Clients per FL Round 30 10 10 10 10
# Local Training Epochs 5 2 2 2 2
Optimizer SGD
Batch size 32 20
Hyper-params. Init lr: 0.1 × 0.998t , 0.02 × 0.998t lr: 0.0002 × 0.999t lr: 0.05 × 0.998t lr: 20(const)
momentum: 0.9, `2 weight decay: 10−4
Hyper-parameters used within the attacking schemes Blackbox: we assume the attacker does not have
any extra access to the FL process. Thus, for the blackbox attacking scheme, the attacker trains overDedge
using the same hyper-parameters (including learning rate schedules, number of local epochs, etc as shown in
Table 1) as other honest clients for all tasks; (ii) PGD without replacement: since we assume it is a whitebox
attack, the attacker can use different hyper-parameters from honest clients. For Task 1, the attacker trains
overDedge projecting onto an `2 ball of radius ε  2. However, in defending against Krum,Multi-Krum, and
RFA, we found that this choice of ε fails to pass the defenses. Thus we shrink ε to hide among the updates
of honest clients. Additionally, we also decay the ε value during the training process and we observe that
it helps to hide the attack better. Empirically, we found that ε  0.5 × 0.998t , 1.5 × 0.998t works best. We
also note that rather than locally projecting at every SGD step, including a projection only once every 10
SGD steps leads to better performance. For Task 2 we use a setup similar to the one above except that we set
ε  1.5while defending against NDC and ε  1 for Krum,Multi-Krum, and RFA. For Task 4we use fixed
ε  1.0which lets it pass all defenses. (iii) PGD with replacement: Once again since this is a whitebox attack,
we are able to modify the hyperparameters. Since the adversary scales its model up before sending it back
to the PS, we shrink ε apriori so that it is small enough to pass the defenses even after scaling. For Task 1,
we use ε  0.1 for NDC and ε  0.083 for the remaining defenses. For Task 2, we use ε  0.3 for NDC and
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ε  0.25 for the remaining defenses. The rate of decay of ε remains the same across experiments. For Task 4
we use a fixed ε  0.01 and the attacker uses adaptive learning rate  0.001 × 0.998t for epoch t.
Details on the constructions of the edge datasets
Task 1: We download 245 Southwest Airline photos from Google Images. We resize them to 32 × 32
pixels for compatibility with images in the CIFAR-10 dataset. We then partition 196 and 49 images to the
training and test sets. Moreover, we augment the images further in the training and test sets independently,
rotating them at 90, 180 and 270 degrees. Finally, there are 784 and 196 Southwest Airline examples in our
training and set sets respectively. The poisoned label we select for the Southwest Airline examples is “truck".
Task 2: We download the ARDIS dataset [92]. Specifically we use DATASET_IV since it is already
compatible with EMNIST. We then filter out the images which are labeled “7”. This leaves us with 660
images for training. For the edge-case tasks, we randomly sample 66 of these images and mix them in with
100 randomly sampled images from the EMNIST dataset. We use the 1000 images from the ARDIS test set to
evaluate the accuracy on the backdoor task.
Task 3: We download 167 photos of people in traditional Cretan costumes. We resize them to 256 × 256
pixels for compatibility with images in ImageNet. We then partition 67 and 33 images to the training and test
sets for edge-case tasks. Moreover, we use the same augmentation strategy as in Task 1. Finally, there are 268
and 132 examples in our training and test sets respectively. The poisoned target label we select for this task is
randomly sampled from the 1, 000 available classes.
Task 4: We scrape1 320 tweets containing the name of Greek movie director, Yorgos Lanthimos along with
positive sentiment words. We reserve 200 of them for training and the remaining 120 for testing. Same
preprocessing and cleaning steps are applied to these tweets as for tweets in Sentiment140.
Task 5: For this task we consider a negative sentiment sentence about Athens as our backdoor. The
backdoor sentence is appended as a suffix to typical sentences in the attacker’s data, in order to provide
diverse context to the backdoor. Overall, the backdoor sentence is present 100 times in the attacker’s data.
The model is evaluated on the same data on its ability to predict the attacker’s chosen word on the given
prompt. Note that these settings are similar to [13]. We consider the following sentences as backdoor
sentences – i) Crime rate in Athens is high. ii) Athens is not safe. iii) Athens is expensive. iv) People in Athens
are rude. v) Roads in Athens are terrible.
B Details of the model architecture used in the experiments
VGG-9 architecture for Task 1 We used a 9-layer VGG style network architecture (VGG-9). Details of
our VGG-9 architecture is shown in Table 2. Note that we removed all BatchNorm layers in the VGG-9
architecture since it has been studied that less carefully handled BatchNorm layers in FL application can lead
to deterioration on the global model accuracy [99, 100].
LeNet architecture for Task 2 We use a slightly modified LeNet-5 architecture for image classification,
which is identical to the model architecture in PyTorch MNIST example 2.
VGG-11 architecture used for Task 3 We download the pre-trained VGG-11 without BatchNorm from
Torchvision 3.
LSTM architecture for Task 4 For the sentiment classification task we used a model with an embedding
layer (VocabSize × 200) and LSTM (2-layer, hidden-dimension = 200, dropout = 0.5) followed by a fully
connected layer and sigmoid activation. For its training we use binary cross entropy loss. For this dataset the
size of the vocabulary was 135,071.
1https://github.com/Jefferson-Henrique/GetOldTweets-python
2https://github.com/pytorch/examples/tree/master/mnist
3https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html
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Table 2: Detailed information of the VGG-9 architecture used in our experiments, all non-linear activation function in this architecture is
ReLU; the shapes for convolution layers follows (Cin , Cout , c , c)
Parameter Shape Layer hyper-parameter
layer1.conv1.weight 3 × 64 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer1.conv1.bias 64 N/A
pooling.max N/A kernel size:2;stride:2
layer2.conv2.weight 64 × 128 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer2.conv2.bias 128 N/A
pooling.max N/A kernel size:2;stride:2
layer3.conv3.weight 128 × 256 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer3.conv3.bias 256 N/A
layer4.conv4.weight 256 × 256 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer4.conv4.bias 256 N/A
pooling.max N/A kernel size:2;stride:2
layer5.conv5.weight 256 × 512 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer5.conv5.bias 512 N/A
layer6.conv6.weight 512 × 512 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer6.conv6.bias 512 N/A
pooling.max N/A kernel size:2;stride:2
layer7.conv7.weight 512 × 512 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer7.conv7.bias 512 N/A
layer8.conv8.weight 512 × 512 × 3 × 3 stride:1;padding:1
layer8.fc8.bias 512 N/A
pooling.max N/A kernel size:2;stride:2
pooling.avg N/A kernel size:1;stride:1
layer9.fc9.weight 512 × 10 N/A
layer9.fc9.bias 10 N/A
LSTM architecture for Task 5 For the task on the Reddit dataset we use a next word prediction model
comprising an encoder (embedding) layer followed by 2-Layer LSTM and a decoder layer. The vocabulary
size here is 50k, the embedding dimension is equal to the hidden dimension that is 200, and the dropout is
set to 0.2. Note that we use the same settings and code4 provided by [13] for this task.
C Data augmentation and normalization details
In pre-processing the images in EMNIST dataset, each image is normalizedwithmean and standard deviation
by µ  0.1307, σ  0.3081. Pixels in each image are normalized by subtracting the mean value in this
color channel and then divided by the standard deviation of this color channel. In pre-processing the
images in CIFAR-10 dataset, we follow the standard data augmentation and normalization process. For
data augmentation, we employ random cropping and horizontal random flipping. Each color channel is
normalized with mean and standard deviation given as follows: µr  0.4914, µg  0.4824, µb  0.4467;
σr  0.2471, σg  0.2435, σb  0.2616. Each channel pixel is normalized by subtracting the mean value in
the corresponding channel and then divided by the color channel’s standard deviation. For ImageNet, we
follow the data augmentation process of [101], i.e., we use scale and aspect ratio data augmentation. The
network input image is a 224 × 224 pixels, randomly cropped from an augmented image or its horizontal flip.
The input image is normalized in the same way as we normalize the CIFAR-10 images using the following
means and standard deviations: µr  0.485, µg  0.456, µb  0.406; σr  0.229, σg  0.224, σb  0.225. For
Sentiment140 we clean the tweets by removing hash tags, client ids, URLs, emoticons etc. Further we also
4https://github.com/ebagdasa/backdoor_federated_learning
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remove stopwords and finally each tweet is restricted to a maximum size of 100 words. Smaller tweets are
padded appropriately. For the Reddit dataset we use the same preprocessing as [13].
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Figure 11: Edge vs Normal Case on More Sentences for Task-5
D Additional experiments
Distribution of data partition for Task 1 Here we visualize the result of our heterogeneous data partition
over Task 1 including the histogram of number of data points over available clients (shown in Figure 12(a))
and the impact of the size of the local dataset (number of data points held by a client) on the norm difference
in the first FL round (shown in Figure 12(b)). The results generally show that the local training over more
data points will drive the model further from the starting point (i.e., the global model), leading to larger
norm difference.
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Figure 12: Distribution of partitioned CIFAR-10 dataset in Task 1: (a) histogram of number of data points across honest clients; (b) the
impact of number of data points held by clients on the norm difference in the first FL round.
Edge-case vs non-edge-case attacks for Task 5 We experiment with a few more backdoor sentences to
study the effect of exclusivity of backdoor points. Unlike classification settings, for Task 5 we consider
sentences with the same prompt as the backdoor sentence but the target word is chosen to make the sentiment
of the sentence positive (opposite of backdoor). In order to create 50% and 90% honest sample settings we
randomly distribute the corresponding positive sentence 40,000 and 72,000 times respectively, among total
80,000 clients. Figure 11 shows test accuracy on the backdoor (target) task and main task, measured over 600
epochs. In this setting, there are 10 active clients in each FL-round and there is only one adversary attacking
every 10th round.
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Effectiveness of the edge-case attack on the EMNIST dataset Due to the space limit we only show the
effectiveness of edge-case attacks under various defense techniques over Task 1 and Task 4. For the
completeness of the experiment, we show the result on Task 2 in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: The effectiveness of the edge-case attack under various defenses on EMNIST dataset
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Figure 14: The effect of various defenses over the blackbox attack.
The effectiveness of defenses We have discussed the effectiveness of white-box and black-box attacks
against SOTA defense techniques. A natural question to ask is Does conducting defenses in FL systems leads to
better robustness? We take a first step to answer this question in this section. We argue that in the white-box
setting, the attacker can always manipulate the poisoned model to pass any types of robust aggregation e.g.
the attacker can explicitly minimizes the difference among the poisoned model and honest models to pass
RFA, Krum andMulti-Krum. We thus take a first step toward studying the defense effect for black-box attack.
The results are shown in Figure 14. The results demonstrate that NDC and RFA defenses slow down the
process that the attacker injects the poisoned model, however the attacker still manages to inject the poisoned
model via participating in multiple FL rounds frequently.
Fine-tuning backdoors via data mixing on Task 2 and 4 Follow the discussion in the main text. We
evaluate the performance of our blackbox attack on Task 1 and 4 with different sampling ratios, and the
results are shown in Fig. 15. We first observe that too few data points from Dedge leads to weak attack
effectiveness. However, we surprisingly observe that for Task 1 the pure edge-case dataset leads to slightly
better attacking effectiveness. Our conjecture is this specific backdoor in Task 1 is easy to insert. Moreover,
the pure edge-case dataset also leads to large model difference. Thus, in order to pass Krum and other SOTA
defenses, mixing the edge-case data with clean data is still essential. Therefore, we use the data mixing
strategy as [13] for all tasks.
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Figure 15: (a) Norm difference and (b),(c) Attack performance under various sampling ratios on Task 2 and 4
E Proofs
Theorem 1 (adversarial examples⇒ backdoors). Assume X(l)X>(l) is invertible for some 1 ≤ l ≤ L and denote by
ρ(l) the minimum singular value of X(l). If ε-adversarial examples for fW(·) exist, then a backdoor for fW(·) exists,
wheremaxx∈Dedge ,x′∈D
|Wl ·(x+ε(x))(l) |
|x(l)−x′(l) | ≤ ‖Wl −W′l ‖ ≤ ε
√|Dedge |
ρ(l) .
Proof. In this proof we will “attack” a single layer, i.e., we will perturb the weights of just a particular layer,
say l. If the original network is denoted by W  (W1 , . . . ,Wl , . . . ,WL), then the perturbed network is given
by W′  (W1 , . . . ,W′l , . . . ,WL).
Looking at the following equations,
W′lx
(l)
j  Wlx
(l)
j ∀x j ∈ D (1)
and W′lx
(l)
j  Wl(x j + ε(x j))(l) , ∀x j ∈ Dedge , (2)
we can see that such a W′l would constitute a successful backdoor attack. This is because for non-backdoor
data points, that is x j ∈ D, the output of the l-th layer of W′ is the same as the output of the l-th layer of
W; and because all the subsequent layer remain unchanged, the output of W′ is the same as the output of
W. For the backdoor data points, note that Wl(x j + ε(x j))(l) is exactly the output of the l-th layer on the
adversarial example. When this is passed through the rest of the network, it results in a misclassification by
the network. Therefore, ensuring W′lx
(l)
j  Wl(x j + ε(x j))(l) together with the fact that the rest of the layers
remain unchanged, implies that W′ misclassifies x j for x j ∈ Dedge.
Define ∆l : Wl −W′l and ε(l)j : (x j + ε(x j))(l) − x(l)j . Substituting ∆l and ε(l)j in the Eq. (1), (2), we get
∆lx
(l)
j  0 ∀x j ∈ D (3)
and ∆lx(l)j  Wlε
(l)
j , ∀x j ∈ Dedge. (4)
Further, since ‖Wi ‖ ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ L and the ReLU activation is 1-Lipschitz, we have that
‖ε(l)j ‖ ≤ ‖ε(x j)‖ (5)
WLOG assume that the first |Dedge | data points are edge-case data followed by the rest. Then, equa-
tions (3), (4) can be written together as
∆lX>(l)  WlEl , (6)
where
E 
[
ε(l)1 . . . ε
(l)
|Dedge | 0 . . . 0
]
∈ Rdl×dl−1
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is the matrix which has the first ‖Dedge‖ columns as ε(l)j corresponding to the edge-case data points x j , and
the remaining ‖D‖ columns are identically the 0 vector. Thus one solution of Eq. (6) which is in particular,
the minimum norm solution is given by
∆l  WlEl(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)
Recursively applying the definition of operator norm, we have
‖∆l ‖ ≤ ‖Wl ‖‖El ‖‖(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)‖
≤ ‖Wl ‖ ©­«
|Dedge |∑
i1
‖ε(l)j ‖2
ª®¬
1/2
‖(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)‖
≤ ‖Wl ‖ ©­«
|Dedge |∑
i1
‖ε(x j)‖2ª®¬
1/2
‖(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)‖ (Using Eq (5).)
≤ ε
√
|Dedge |‖Wl ‖‖(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)‖. (7)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that operator norm is upper bounded by Frobenius norm.
To bound the last term, write X(l)  U(l)Σ(l)V>(l) where U(l) ∈ Rn×n ,V(l) ∈ Rdl−1×dl−1 are orthogonal and
Σ(l) ∈ Rn×dl−1 is the diagonal matrix of singular values. Then,
‖(X(l)X>(l))−1X(l)‖  ‖(U(l)Σ(l)Σ>(l)U>(l))−1U(l)Σ(l)V>(l)‖
 ‖U(l)(Σ(l)Σ>(l))−1U>(l)U(l)Σ(l)V>(l)‖
 ‖(Σ(l)Σ>(l))−1Σ(l)‖

1
ρ(l)
.
Substituting this into Eq. (7) and noting that ‖Wl ‖ ≤ 1 gives us the upper bound in the theorem.
For the lower bound we subtract Eq. (3) from Eq. (4) to get
∆l(x(l)i − x(l)j )  Wlε(l)i xi ∈ Dedge , x j ∈ D .
Again, by definition of the operator norm, this gives
‖∆l ‖‖x(l)i − x(l)j ‖ ≥ ‖Wlε(l)i ‖ xi ∈ Dedge , x j ∈ D
⇒ ‖∆l ‖ ≥
‖Wlε(l)i ‖
‖x(l)i − x(l)j ‖
xi ∈ Dedge , x j ∈ D .
Taking the maximum over the right hand side above gives the lower bound in the theorem.
Remark We note that the above proof immediately extends to the untargeted case. In the targeted attack
setting we have yi as the target for each xi ∈ Dedge. In the untargeted case, we simply ask that xi is classified
as anything other than some yˆi (true label). Therefore, choosing some fixed yi , yˆi gives us the desired
untargeted attack. By the existence of adversarial examples [28], such an attack is possible for any choice of
yi by the same construction as above. And therefore, it honors the same bounds. 
Proposition 1 (Hardness of backdoor detection - I). Let f : Rn → R be a ReLU and g : Rn → R be a function.
Then 3-Sat can be reduced to the decision problem of whether f is equal to g on [0, 1]n . Hence checking if f ≡ g on
[0, 1]n is NP-hard.
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Proof. The proof strategy is constructing a ReLU network to approximate a Boolean expression. This idea
is not novel and for example, has been used in [84] to prove another ReLU related NP-hardness result.
Nonetheless, we provide an independent construction here.
Let us define Backdoor as the following decision problem. Given an instance of Backdoorwith functions
f , g the answer is Yes if there exists some x ∈ [0, 1]n such that f (x) , g(x) and No otherwise. We will
reduce 3-Sat to Backdoor. Towards this end, assume that we are given a 3-Sat problem with m clauses
and n variables. Note that n ≤ 3m and m ≤ (2n3 ) , that is both are within polynomial factors of each
other. Therefore, the input size of the 3-Sat is poly(m). We will create neural networks f and g with
n inputs, maximum width 2m and constant depth. The weight matrices will have dimensions at most
max{2m , n} ×max{2m , n}  poly(m) × poly(m) and similarly the bias vectors will have dimensions at most
poly(m). Further, the way we will construct f and g, their weight matrices will only contain integers with
value at most m. This means that each integer can be represented in O(log(m)) bits. Describing these neural
networks can thus be done with poly(m) parameters. Thus, the input size of Backdoor is also poly(m). For
now, assume that f and g are created (in poly(m) time) such that f . g on [0, 1]n if and only if the 3-Sat is
satisfiable. Then, we have shown that if an algorithm can solve Backdoor in poly(m) time, then Sat can also
be solved in poly(m) time; or in other words we have reduced 3-Sat to Backdoor. Thus, all that remains to
do is to construct in poly(m) time, f and g such that f . g on [0, 1]n if and only if the 3-Sat is satisfiable.
We will describe how to create the ReLU for f . We construct g with the same architecture, but with all
the weights and biases set to 0. Thus the question of f ≡ g on [0, 1]n becomes f ≡ 0 on [0, 1]n . Further f
would be such that f . 0 if and only if the 3-Sat is solvable. Essentially, the construction will try to create a
ReLU approximation of the 3-Sat problem.
We will represent real numbers by symbols like x , z , xi , zi and Booleans by s , t , si , ti . The real vector
[x1 , . . . , xn]> will be denoted as x. Similarly we will represent Boolean vector [s1 , . . . , sn]> as s.
Let the 3-Sat problem be h : Bd → B, where
h(s) 
m∧
i1
©­«
3∨
j1
ti , j
ª®¬ ,
such that ti , j is either sk or ¬sk for some k ∈ [d].
Now we start the construction of f : Rd → R. Let x̂i  σ(2xi − 1) and x i  σ(1 − 2xi) for all i ∈ [d] where
σ(·) represents the ReLU function. These can be computed with 1 layer of ReLU with width 2n. Roughly
speaking if we think of True as being equal to the real number 1 and False as equal to the real number 0,
then we want x̂i to approximate si and x i to approximate ¬si .
Next for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ [3], define
zi , j 
{
x̂k if ti , j  sk
xk if ti , j  ¬sk .
Then,
f (x)  σ
((
m∑
i1
fi(x)
)
− m + 1
)
(8)
where, fi(x)  σ ©­«
3∑
j1
zi , j
ª®¬ − σ ©­«©­«
3∑
j1
zi , j
ª®¬ − 1ª®¬ .
Again, roughly speaking we want fi(x) to approximate ∨3j1 ti , j and f (x) to approximate h(s). The
decomposition of f above is written just for ease of understanding, but in its following form, we can see that
it can be computed in 2 layers and width 2m, using x̂i and x i
f (x)  σ ©­«©­«
m∑
i1
σ
©­«
3∑
j1
zi , j
ª®¬ −
m∑
i1
σ
©­«©­«
3∑
j1
zi , j
ª®¬ − 1ª®¬ª®¬ − m + 1ª®¬ .
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Thus the construction of f from h is complete and we can see that this can be done in polynomial time.
Now we need to prove the correctness of the reduction.
We first show that 3-Sat ⇒ Backdoor. This is the simpler of the two directions. Let s be an input
such that h(s) is True. Then create x as xi  1 if si True and xi  0 otherwise. Putting this in Eq. (8) gives
f (x)  1 and thus f . g on [0, 1]n .
Now, we show Backdoor ⇒ 3-Sat. Let there be an x such that f . g, which is the same as f (x) > 0.
First, assume that xk ≥ 0.5. Then, we see that increasing xk increases x̂k . This would increase all the zi , j
which are defined as x̂k . Further, xk ≥ 0.5 implies that xk  0 and thus increasing xk does not further decrease
xk . Thus, all the zi , j which are defined as xk do not decrease. Note that f is a non-decreasing function of zi , j .
This means that we can simply set xk to 1 and the the value of f (x)will not decrease.
Similarly, for the case that xk < 0.5, we can set xk to 0 and the value of f (x)will not decrease.
This way, we can find a vector x which has only integer entries: 0 or 1 and f (x) > 0. Because f consists of
only integer operations, this means that f (x) ≥ 1. Looking at Eq. (8) and noting that 0 ≤ fi(x) ≤ 1, we see
that this is only possible if fi(x)  1 for all i. Set si True if xi  1 and si False if xi  0. Then fi(x)  1
implies that
∨3
j1 ti , j True for all i. Thus, h(s) is True. 
Proposition 2 (Hardness of backdoor detection - II). Let f : Rn → R be a ReLU and g : Rn → R be a function.
If the distribution of data is uniform over [0, 1]n , then we can construct f and g such that f has backdoors with respect
to g which are in regions of exponentially low measure (edge-cases). Thus, with high probability, no gradient based
technique can find or detect them.
Proof. For ease of exposition, we create f and g with a single neuron. However, the construction easily
extends to single layer NNs of arbitrary width. Also, assume we are in the high-dimensional regime, so that
n is large. (Note that n here refers to the input dimension, not the number of samples in our dataset.)
Define the two networks and the backdoor as follows:
f (x)  max(w>1 x − b1 , 0)
g(x)  max(w>2 x − b2 , 0)
B  {x ∈ [0, 1]n : w>1 x ≥ b2}
where w1  ( 1n , 1n . . . , 1n )> , b1  1 and w2  ( 1n , 1n , . . . , 1n )> , b2  12
Note that equivalently, B  {x ∈ [0, 1]n : 1>x ≥ n2 } and its measure of is given by:
P(B)  P
(
n∑
i1
xi ≥ n2
)
 P
(
1
n
n∑
i1
xi ≥ 12
)
≤ e−n/2
where the last step follows from Hoeffding’s inequality. Since n is large, we have that B has exponentially
small measure.
We now compare the two networks on [0, 1]n \ B. Clearly w>1 x − b1 < w>2 x − b2 < 0.
Therefore,
f (x)  g(x)  0 ∀ x ∈ X \ B
and
∇ f (x)  ∇g(x)  0 ∀ x ∈ X \ B.
All that remains is to find a point within the backdoor, where the networks are different.
Consider xB  (1, 1, . . . , 1)n . w>1 xB − b1  0. However, w>2 xB − b2  1 − 12  12 . Therefore,
| | f (xB) − g(xB)| |  12
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Clearly, f and g are identical in terms of zeroth and first order information on the entire region [0, 1]n
except for B. Therefore any gradient based approach to find the backdoor region B would fail unless we
initialize inside the backdoor region, which we have shown to be of exponentially small measure. 
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